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Economic Transformation: State of Art and Some Theoretical Reflections1
Gone are the days when those specialising on Central and Eastern Europe were
forced to rely on sporadic information released by the authorities and
complemented by fanciful jigsaw-puzzle-playing by Kremlin watchers and other
outside analysts. By now reporting has become standard, methods mostly come up
to international standards, and international organisations as well as prestigious
research centres and banks regularly cover current developments in the area.
Information has become abundant rather than scarce. Decisionmakers and analysts
alike tend to face the opposite problem, namely how to filter out relevant pieces of
information from the flood.
It seems senseless to make an effort at recapitulating data on two dozens of
countries. Instead, after commenting on some of the regional data (cf. appendix)
first a comprised evaluation is attempted from the comparative perspective, trying
to figure out one or two of those features which may be seem as truly new. Then,
part II attempts to present a functional analysis on the base of the theoretical
knowledge accumulated so far. Part three addresses the newly discovered problem
of deregulation versus setting new rules of the game as a major new theme for
transformation studies and policies alike. Finally part four tries to address those
new subjects which are likely to replace the trinity of stabilisation, liberalisation
and privatisation as main concerns for the post-transition phase of systemic change
in the postsocialist world. In a way the analysis is bound to remain fragmentary, as
the scope of the subject is better suited for a book - but even then it is unlikely to
cover the entire subject in toto.
What's New?
First and foremost the differentiation of the country group has become more
pronounced then ever. Whereas post-Soviet states except the Baltic’s continued to
decline, Central Europe entered a new growth path. Recent econometric evidence
(Fischer et al. 1997; Gelb et al. 1997) has demonstrated: whatever the method in
use, whatever the way one tries to measure liberalisation, it is absolutely clear that
disinflation and also liberalisation (both in the domestic and the external sectors) do
constitute a vital precondition for growth to resume. Not only the alternative of
softer approaches, exercised by the Ukrainian and Romanian governments in the
1992-96 period failed. The stabilisatory medicine, if not taken for long enough,
could not help, as the softening up of originally very tough Romanian (Daianu
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1994) and Bulgarian (Houbenova 1994) stances amply demonstrated. By contrast,
not only Croatia and Lithuania demonstrated, that sound policies do breed fruits,
even if later started. Even in Russia as long as the presidential power has been
strengthened, the cooperation of monetary and fiscal authorities ensured, and
coherent economic policies not only promulgated (as under Gaidar in 1992) but
practised, major breakthroughs in terms of disinflation, capital flows, exchange rate
stability and enterprise plus banking behaviour could be observed (Csaba 1997).
This settled the once much disputed issue, viz. that Keynesian growth generating
policies could have alleviated the costs of economic change. Contrasting Polish and
Ukrainian, or Estonian and Belorussian experience may suffice to prove the
opposite. There is no way to escape from stabilisation, meanwhile these policies do
generate growth, whereas postponing liberalisation and disinflation only lengthens
the pain. The latter, not the former road leads to depression.
As far as the famous inflation versus unemployment trade off (Philips-curve) is
concerned, this does not seem to hold, except for a brief introductory period when
bankruptcies and layoffs first occur. Not only the Czech, but Polish, Hungarian,
Slovak, Ukrainian and Bulgarian figures seem to defy this conventional wisdom.
Unemployment seems to be closer correlated to labour market arrangements and
overall socio-economic inertia (or the lack of it). East Germany, too, fits into this
landscape.
Inflation, by contrast proved to be much harder to fight than most economic models
forecast. It is remarkable, that even in the champions of price stability, the Czech
and Slovak Republics, Slovenia and Croatia price increases exceed OECD levels
and dangers of sticking in higher levels seem imminent. Detailed analyses of the
Czech and Slovak cases (Frensch 1997) name gradualism in price liberalisation,
informal wage equalisation practices (quasi-indexing) and problems of managing
money supply with a fixed rate of exchange as the main causes. In Slovenia the
small size of the country leads to a very strong push of the money supply due to the
inflow of foreign capital, as the domestic money base is small. In Croatia, by
contrast, keeping prices down coexists with the practice of de-facto credit rationing
(Kraft 1996) thus a liberalisation of financial market, abolition of credit allocation
and introducing the recoupment criteria (and international accounting standards) for
banks may fundamentally change this picture in the future. In Hungary the 1995
adjustment package used a 10 per cent increase in inflation to suppress domestic
uses of GDP in order to correct the current account. This, in turn, sustained
inflationary expectations and renders attempts at fast disinflation, as currently
contemplated by the government (to single digit levels by 1999) fairly unlikely.
Also in Poland seems to have stuck in a high growth-moderate inflation scenario,
typical of the developing (rather than of advanced) economies. Resumption of
growth in the Baltic’s also took place while inflation is still double digit. Finally
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Balkan countries present cases for temporary rather than fundamental cures to this
illness. In Serbia-Montenegro, the Avramovic-reforms could not be sustained, as
the intertwined political and economic structures resisted the economic pressures
for adjustment, that have been stemming from the monetary sphere. Fiscal
overspending - partly due to defense expenditures, partly due to sustaining "core
industries" - simply undermined exchange rate stability in a textbook-like manner
in about 9 months. With 60 plus per cent inflation in 1996 the next attempt to
stabilise will be even more costly and - less credible. In Albania, the improvements
in macro-stabilisation - one much hailed in Washington - proved to be illusory and
based on rather unconventional methods of management of both savings and cash-
flows, which triggered an outbreake of social protest. Finally the new government
of Victor Ciorbea has uncovered the malpractices of its predecessor in misreporting
actual economic performance in 1994-96, and was forced to institute a
Balcerowicz-type of stabilisation package. Even more severe measures had to be
adopted by the centre-right Kostov administration in Bulgaria, where the toughest
stabilisatory instrument available, the currency board (previously used successfully
in Argentina, Estonia and Lithuania) was introduced from April 1997.
Unsurprisingly consumer price inflation has been closely interrelated to exchange
rate developments. In this respect the choice of the exchange rate régime, as well as
the congruence of this choice with fiscal and monetary policies has been of
paramount significance. Discretionary and large devaluations though do improve
the current account position, however they fuel inflation. Anchoring the rate of
exchange, by contrast, may prove unsustainable, as was the case with the rouble
and in 1994-96 with the dinar and the leu. Moreover fixed exchange rates, or
alternatively real effective appreciation of the currency even under a crawling peg
régime, like it is the case in Poland, produce sizeable trade imbalances. Recent
Czech current account adjustment measures, which are comparable in size with the
1995 Hungarian package, do indicate that even large and regular invisibles may
only partly offset trade deficits, if the latter are recurring. The same applies to
Romania. In sum, transforming countries seem to have been pushed into a tricky
balancing act between the need to ensure exchange rate stability (in order to foster
foreign investments and domestic price stability) on the one hand, and keeping their
current account equilibria in order, on the other. Not only institutional rigidities and
inertia, but probably also the size and scope of those truly historic rearrangements
may explain why these conflicting goals could not be so simply reconciled as
econometric models in international trade theory would suggest. Structural,
institutional, trade and employment changes have been compounded with
inexperienced administration working under conditions of extreme uncertainty. To
name but a few of these: frequent changes in government, unforeseen behaviour of
major economic agents, including the state, households and the corporate sector,
the type of relevant assumptions regarding fundamental macroeconomic variables,
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problems inherent in managing new techniques; ambiguous signals arriving from
the major point of orientation, the EU.
By contrast, it is worth recalling some problems, which used to figure high on the
agenda but has not proved to be decisive. Stabilisatory policies did work even if the
institutional infrastructure of their application was imperfect. The technology of
privatisation mattered relatively little against the revealed preferences of the
government. For instance, Hungary proceeded not only faster, but also deeper in
scope while relying on standard methods (cf. the evaluation of Neue Züricher
Zeitung, 10/11 May 1997), whereas reliance on vouchers could not help a basically
disinclined Bulgarian government. Recovery has not been conditional on external
financing. Bulgaria, Romania and the Ukraine were running debts in vain, whereas
the net position of Baltic states even improved while growth resumed. Debt and
growth are no longer fellow travellers, as once development economics used to
postulate. On the contrary: the quickly growing debt is likely to put a brake on the
previous government-lead dynamics of the Slovak economy as well (Altmann
1997) - a lesson Hungary, Romania and the Czech Republic had to recapitulate
quite recently. Finally the interrelationships between stabilisation and systemic
change could also be better understood by now. Stabilisation is clearly possible
without any systemic change, as the economy of Ukraine and Belarus2 recently
indicated. However, such a stance can not be sustained short of systemic change or
massive external financing. The union treaty of March 1997 is an obvious attempt
on the Belorussian side to find a bridging solution to a trade deficit which runs
regularly at a tenth of its GDP. One wonders, whether Russian economic interest
matches this, or even if a strategic wish were there to do so, real possibilities would
probably still be lacking. But the story can, indeed, be reversed: Russian, Croatian
and Baltic experience indicates,  that systemic progress in change positively
requires stabilisation.
In sum, even a rudimentary overview of basic statistic is indicative of
transformation being an excellent subject of conventional economic analyses,
where some of the basic assumptions of economic theories could be tested.
Empirical evidence could, indeed, be interpreted on the base of available
knowledge, fitting quite well into well established oretical frames. Thus frequent
outcries calling for brand new theories, of questioning the use of available
economic framework seem poorly founded, indeed.
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New Perceptions of Transformation
In a way transformation studies have been catching up with the international
literature on policy reform (cf. e.g. Williamson 1994) in so far as sustainability
rather than systemic design or technologies of implementing particular policies has
become the top item on the agenda. Similarly to Latin American experience,
problems of backlash and regressions into past practices have captured the attention
of analysts. These turns produced a new trend in dynamic modelling as well as new
policy suggestions - a development yet to take place in transformation studies. This
is a problem, as early expectations of quick fixes, of fast emergence of „natural“
capitalist institutions never materialised. In the transitory period these and some
other qualitative issues have come to the fore. In a way, front runners have been
confronted with some problems that are quite familiar to those faced by advanced
societies. This, indeed, may be taken as a sign for the transitory phase being over,
or an indirect success indicator (Bönker 1995, 203-204) if lobbying, rent-seeking
and building of redistributory coalitions, i.e. OECD-normalcy starts to replace the
heroic ideological controversies and grand projects of the early years.
Sustainability gains in importance as long as it is appreciated, that at the
policymaking level, the convenient assumptions of economic theory on
instantaneous adjustment simply do not apply. Thus one of the most demanding
tasks of both analysts and policy advisers is to orchestrate support for sensible
policies and launch measures that set into motion virtuous rather than vicious
circles and synergies. A fair degree of policy continuity may well emerge
spontaneously, as was the case in Poland in 1991-97 as well as in Slovakia since
1993, in Estonia since 1991, in Hungary and in Slovenia since 1989. This is both
good news and bad news. Good news as all sustainability rests on institutiona-
lisation3 and self-propelling processes, which did seem to come about. It's bad news
insofar as spontaneously evolving policies may remain half-hearted, inconsistent or
simply running out of steam. East Germany may be a point in case. Though
researchers have been recurringly cautioning against the neglect of bottom up
enterpreneurship and the whole related issue of SME, this problem is beginning to
be taken seriously only recently, with the five institutes forecasting truly „Western
levels“ of growth for the Eastern provinces, 2 p.c. in 1997 and 2.5 p.c. for 1998 (cf.
Neue Züricher Zeitung, 23.04.97). This implies that 1996 was not a mere
derailment. In the Czech Republic the governing coalition seems to have had a sure
bet for its repeated victory, thus slowed down structural reforms. The emergent
impasse in 1996, with the opposition calling for a further go-slow (which was the
practice, not the platform of the Klaus administration) may exacerbate the problem
by the lack of support for privatisation and foreign strategic ownership in the
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financial sector.4 As crises of small banks tended to be covered up by their merging
in the large banks, the emergent duopoly of Ceska Stroitelna + Csob versus
Komercni Banka well be hard to privatise, if only for reasons of size (Boland,
1996). The idea of first letting an equity market to emerge and later regulating it,
turned out to be counterproductive, with an unregulated but also intransparent
market leading to strange concentration of power combined with lasting volatility
bearing no relation to corporate performance (Reed 1997).
A similar running out of steam could be observed also in Hungary between July
1992 and March 1995, as well as in Poland in the 1993-95 period. In both cases
wide ranging structural reforms were though planned, but their implementation
foundered on the resistance of interest groups capitalising on the unreformed
arrangements. In this respect economic analysis bumped into one of the evergreens
of political science, when the limits to consensual decisionmaking was raised in the
context of ever protracting major reforms and rearrangements (Kornai 1995/96).
And indeed, some of the rearrangements pertaining to the fundamentals of the
previous social contract, like the redistribution of wealth or the retoilaring of the
welfare state will hardly come about if each and every step of it has to pass a
referendum. This is not to belittle the need for building up reform constituencies,
but the scope of transformation is probably such that traditional buying out
compensation corruption techniques are probably incommensurate to this task.
And indeed, when the Hungarian government in 1995 and the Polish government in
late 1996 ceased to adhere to the previous unwritten rules of the game, major
systemic breakthroughs occurred. In Hungary large scale privatisation of utilities
and the banking sector took place. In Poland some of the previously protected large
banks, Bank Handlowy and PBK majority shares were sold, and foreigners were
entitled to buy fixed assets and non-agricultural land (Wall Street Journal and Neue
Züricher Zeitung, both 8 April 1997). In both countries the government decided to
introduce a pension system based on three pillars, two of which are managed by
investment funds.5 Also in Russia the highly successful disinflation policies were
clearly a result of what may be termed the hijacking of the President's original
(populist) electoral economic platform (Glaziev 1997). In Romania likewise, the
Ciorbea government seems to have made good use of its original grace period to
pass long overdue adjustment measures and launch also restructuring. A list of 10
large bankrupt companies was set up to be closed, and the privatisation agency
subordinated to the government to overcome resistance to accelerated privatisation
(Máté 1997).
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The major question in all the cases enumerated lays not so much in investigating
the peculiar circumstances having lead to these developments, but rather the ways
and means of orchestrating these into a sustainable policy line. The answer is non
trivial. While in Bulgaria the April 1997 standby and the resultant currency board
will probably ensure stabilisation, in systemic arrangements no such anchoring
seems feasible. Once privatisation and especially foreign ownership crossed a
certain threshold, there is a point of no return. For instance in Hungary the
consolidation and following privatisation of the big banks to foreign strategic
investors (Balassa 1997) has certainly brought about such a change. In Germany
the constitutional form of reunification has solved the problem. In Russia the
erosion of state power leaves no other way for the national leadership than to rule
by money. Privatised banks and industries seem to favour this too (Dmitriev 1996).
In Poland nomenclatura privatisation and the foreseeable threat of an exploding
pension system make a continuation of this line highly probable, irrespective of
election outcomes. In many other cases, where the intertwining between
government and (quasi)privatised enterprises and banks remain intimate, as in
Croatia or Slovakia, a different sustainability of a different dynamics of change
seems more likely. In other words, while it might be quite a challenge to specify the
mechanics and trajectory of systemic changes, there is no reason to accept or
forecast a scenario of reform blockage, widely entertained in the political science
literature on transformation.
Once we face the fact that a.) systemic change is not a mere transition to a
prearranged terminus on a well established trajectory (cf. above), further b.)
therefore the shock versus gradualism debate is meaningless and misleading (Hoen
1996), it is the quality rather than the speed, scope rather than radicality of
transformatory measures which will be decisive. This also implies that simple,
easily accessible and handy quantitative indicators may be of litte use if actual
progress in systemic change is to be correctly assessed, be that in theory or in
policymaking terms. This is bad news: once an economy is liberalised and basically
privatised, as the OECD membership of front runner transforming countries
testifies, and inflation is also gradually cooling down, a new agenda is required for
analyses. By the way quantitative indicators did not foretell Albanian or Romanian
changes of 1996/97. With subsidy cuts basically gone the genre of changes is
becoming strikingly similar to those in OECD countries: reform of the welfare
state, rearranging agriculture, fighting environmental degradation, integrating the
lagging behind and the socially inactive in the overall social frame. While
transforming economies are becoming gradually more akin to established market
systems, their overall level of development compels them to face some of the
obvious dysfunction’s of current EU economies, rather than purely emulating them.
For instance EU economies are saddled with a combination of low growth and high
unemployment in a secular manner. In technological change multinational
networks create new challenges and new opportunities. Liberalised financial
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markets and their strong feedback exert disciplinary pressure on the free
imagination of systems' designers. But these challenges also caution the
transforming countries of simply copying the existing EU arrangements. As they
are in the phase of reshaping their economic order, the way they set the new rules
will be decisive for shopping the behavior of millions of agents inside and outside
the region. For it is finally of the quality of the new regulatory environment which
is to decide what pattern of behavior will better pay: a rent-seeking or a pro-
competitive behavior (Csaba 1995). The slowing down of growth in the region in
1996-97 is a warning sign: overcoming transformational recession was a one shot
impetus. Conditions for lasting and environmentally tolerable growth do not
emerge by themselves: these have to be created. How this can be done will be the
subject of future research, but some of its policy relevant elements are covered in
the next two sections of this paper.
The Rediscovery of the Regulatory Issue
As the early transformation stage was concerned with creating the fundamentals of
any market economy by stabilisation, privatisation and liberalisation, the subject of
the debate was basically the proper sequence among these, and the ways reform
constituencies could be built up. Having mastered the triple task of the first stage,
at least in the frontrunning countries of CEFTA, but also much of the problems
having emerged in those lagging behind, the issue of regulation, including its
quality comes to the fore. Let us address some of its dimensions!
1. As the policies of transformation tended to be formulated exclusively in terms of
stabilisation rather than in terms of institution building6, especially in the early
period, it is hardly surprising that the latter tended to be neglected (quite in line
with the practices of the predominant formalised neoclassical approach in
economic theory). Whereas theories can set their assumptions and levels of
abstraction fairly freely, at the level of their application disregard for institutions
- and other conditions theorists conventionally assume away - can be a source of
difficulties. It is hardly surprising if the lack of the rule of law, the often
insurmountable obstacles to contract enforcement and the frequently blurred state
of proprietary rights together breed what US theorists call private enforcement
techniques, and those in the region refer to as mafia capitalism. Weak state
power, poor quality and often changing regulation (that may surface in thousands
of decrees trying to address peculiarities that judiciary interpretation of what a
stable and transparent law should) and very high profits from rent-seeking
practices together created an ideal environment for these. It is worth noting, that
not only in Southeast Europe and in the CIS can one observe these features, but
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also in the Baltic’s, where good macrostatistics sometimes overshadow the twin
burden of Soviet legacy and spill over of crisis phenomena from the entire post-
Soviet region to these traditional "commercial gates" (Ostrowska 1997). It seems
certainly naive to believe that this type of mafia capitalism would spontaneously
transform itself into a more civilised edition of the market order purely because
mafia bosses wish to secure their property rights. In fact, from Southern Italy to
Korea, not to mention some stagnant „developing“ nations, one could observe
the stabilisation of rent-seeking rather than competitive structures for historically
longish periods of time. This can be explained in terms of standard economic
theory. First, if one type of equilibria-emerges, short of external shocks, there is
no reason for us do expect a change. Second, if in the years of formation of
norms and rules rent-seeking behaviour pays off and the related informal
institutions also cristallyse, this will be internalised by the successful players and
society at large as a role model. The probability of these structures to solidify
rather than to be civilised is certainly high. This issue is far deeper in scope than
the problem of corruption and of street violence would indicate. It creates a long
term economic and security problem both for these states and their partners short
of remedial actions. In theoretical terms it also means that the minimalist
approach to the state (Aslund 1995; Naishul 1993) proved to be self-defeating as
the outcome is - understandably - a long way from any version of a liberal
market order. Thus in assessing market maturity of entry candidates both to
NATO and EU it seems ill-advised to adopt a narrow technicist focus, as e.g. the
1995 White Book of the Commission did. Advancement in some areas,
especially if it is formal, can certainly not make up for some qualitative
characteristics that may well have gone under due to the much too technical
focus of raising questions. The questionnaire of the Union also suffered from
such a narrow approach.
2. It were equally naive to postulate that globalisation per se would tackle the issue.
On the contrary, external investors in general, but especially portfolio investors
adjust to the prevailing regulatory frame. Although examples of attempts at
leveraging state administrations abound, it is fairly clear that the latter have a
major responsibility for shaping the regulatory as well as the macroeconomic
environment for the individual investor. Merely changing the ownership title,
even if it implies a transfer to foreign private proprietor is but one step on the
long road towards the market economy. It is worth noting that even this very first
step is not always made. Decades of seclusion as well as the obvious interest
conflict between national middle class building and transnational considerations
of efficiency, as represented by MNCs has already produced a series of conflicts.
These are particularly sharp and well publicised in case of the Russian energy
and banking sectors, but also Polish, Czech, Slovak, Croatian and until recently
Romanian privatisation policies were clearly burdened by the priority of societal
considerations over efficiency.
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In any economy with a strong tradition of seclusion reinforced by a lack of
transparency and a habitual intertwining between banking and the state
administration, establishment of a sufficiently high share of foreign ownership in
financial intermediation is a conditio sine qua non for improving allocative
efficiency over and above a trivial level of correcting the distortions inherited
from the command economy period. This consideration will gain in importance
with the time passing, as a factor decisively shaping long term growth patterns.
In the first decade of transformation correcting distortions might well have done
for a reasonable macroeconomic performance. By the turn of the century it will
surely not be the case. Recent empirical analysis of the Polish and Czech banking
reforms (Mizsei and Rudka, 1996) have already indicated some structural
weaknesses of the respective sectors due to the lack of this elements. As it seems,
the Polish government has made a resolute turn in the right direction in 1997 by
accelerating privatisation, whereas the fragility of the Czech government, as well
as disagree-ments with the central bank make similar solutions unlikely for some
time to come.
Whereas in Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria and Russia the role of FDI remained
marginal, in Hungary the open door policies sometimes have lead to
overgenerous arrangements for foreign investors. Large investors are granted tax
holidays way above local SME, which is not in line with international practice
(and was rightly criticised by OECD). In selling one of the largest banks BB, the
buyer could opt for reselling (an obviously nonperforming) affiliation of this
institution, which it did a year later at the cost of Hungarian taxpayers (Mrázik
1997). In other cases foreign investors push for - and often get - undue market
protection, as Daewoo in Poland and Deutsche Telekom/Ameritech in Hungary.
In other words relying on more (and more sound) foreign strategic investment
and creating an efficient and transparent while non-biased regulatory frame
should go hand in hand in bringing about efficient policies of systemic change. It
is worth recalling that efficiency and equity considerations are, in this case,
mutually reinforcing each other. Estonian, Russian, Polish and Hungarian
examples show that strategic investors, especially with greenfield investments
often enjoy a very high social acceptance by virtue of their creating employment
and paying public dues, that may by particularly relevant for municipalities
struggling with chronic unemployment.
3. Financial sector reform is a subject where the problem of regulation is of
paramount significance. This may well sound as a triviality for anyone
specialising in financial economics. However in early transition theories and also
in cases of certain countries this considerations was disregarded or played down.
Especially radical theories of systemic change postulated a quick emergence of
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the capital market thanks to voucher privatisation and the thus resultant massive
trading of corporate papers on an instantaneously created equity market. By now
the dangers inherent in this approach, which lead e.g. in the Czech Republic and
Russia large scale trading of equities without any regulation (even registration),
have become manifest. Large scale frauds lead to the collapse of investment
funds and some smaller banks. Concentration of wealth took place in random
fashion, where neither transparency nor efficiency considerations seem to have
played a major role. Insider trading, usually prohibited in civilised countries, has
become the norm. The Russian government
s debt for equity programme of 1995
resulted in a particularly inefficient form of insider privatisation to financial
rather than strategic investors, with little interest in or ability for restructuring.
It is interesting, that different techniques of orchestrating similarly conceived
mass privatisation7 have lead to a German-type bank dominated industrial
management pattern in the Czech Republic, while the Italian type of political
leverage/network seem to emerge in Poland, and even more in Croatia, Russia,
Latvia and Slovakia. By contrast in Hungary the large share of foreign ownership
as well as the widespread practice of financing via parent company8 has simply
abolished the state side of previous (public) bank-industry interlockage. Banks,
as a rule, do not own industrial equities or companies, a feature only reinforced
during their (pre)privatisation and the concomitant restructuring.
The problem of ex post regulation is well illustrated by the current endeavours of
the respective governments to regulate and enhance prudential regulations. As a
result, in Russia a very strong concentration in the banking sector emerged, with
hundreds of small banks 
voluntarily' escaping into mergers to large Moscow-
based banks. In the Czech Republic the concentration process is less transparent
but all local analysts consider it as manifest. Governmental promotion of the
earlier discussed duopoly situation and widespread bank ownership of industries
via the investment banks though stabilises the system, however decreases
competition and hardly bode well for dynamic allocative efficiency.
Lack of regulation took extreme forms in Albania where totally uncontrolled and
intrasparent investment funds were positively supported by the governing
Democratic Party (in exchange for alleged electoral financing in 1995). The
inevitable chain collapse of the funds has created by March 1997 security
challenge for the international community on par with Bosnia, as neither external
nor domestic coverage for cheated investors emerged.
                                                          
7
 For a detailed discussion cf. Wagener (1997).
8
 As a result only half of the 18 bn $ Hungarian external debt is public sector outstanding, the other half
is privately owned, mostly MNC. This is a major sign of the country's having mastered its traditional
debt problem.
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In these - sometimes extreme - ways transforming societies were forced to
rediscover the role of regulation in the financial sector. It also has become an
empirical fact by now, that the equity market could not be the major instrument
of asset valuation. Quite in line with continental practices the number of
corporations whose shares are traded at the stock exchange is limited against
those who fall outside of this category. While the some 100 companies whose
papers are traded at the Budapest (and sometimes also on foreign) stock
exchange constitute the backbone of the Hungarian economy, and with the
privatisation of banking, energy and the utilities sector, both their share and their
number will grow, the signals of the equity market will be but one among the
success indicators of managers ad their companies alike. In other words,
following the first phase of transformation, equity markets are important as
sources for cheap external financing (against the high real rates in the domestic
banking sector9) as well as instruments of portfolio diversification. But the idea
of their replacing the banking sector in generating savings and their controlling
the market for managers proved to be far-fetched. On the other hand while the
state proved quite dispensable as a provider of funds or a source of subsidies,
meanwhile it proved irreplaceable as a regulator, setting rules, enforcing
disclosure requirements10, check observance of auditing procedures, guarantee
the savings (especially of small investors) and the stability of the system as a
whole. These far-reaching tasks do not constitute any 
interventionist temptation'
against free marketer ideas, as it was sometimes postulated by some theorists, but
boil down to safeguarding the framework in which a competitive game makes
sense at all. Lack of regulation plus mass privatisation, favoured by adherents of
people's capitalism have invariably lead to more oligarchic structures than
standard privatisation plus good quality regulation, even if the latter approach
directly favoured large foreign investors. This finding is not so paradoxical, as it
sounds, still is not widely appreciated as yet.
4. Privatising utilities and the energy sector is a relatively new phenomenon in the
OECD countries as well. More often than not these sectors were organised in a
nation-wide monopoly system run on commands. The breakthrough starting from
Britain and spilling over to Scandinavia - much less to the rest of continental
Europe - has resulted in impressive cost gains for consumers by retaining the
stability of supply. In the British case households gained 15 p.c., industrial users
21 p.c. in 1990-96 in real terms, while the two monopoly suppliers' market shares
fell from 80 to 54 p.c. (cf. Neue Züricher Zeitung, 29.04.97.).
                                                          
9
 Currently in Hungary it is about 8 per cent, in Russia about 20.
10
 Even share owners of investment banks might be denied of elementary, information in Russia and in
the Czech Republic.
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In transforming countries systemic changes offers on opportunity to overcome
those structures, that lead to obvious inefficiencies and unjustified high costs in
most of Western Europe. This would (have) require(d) a first regulate later
privatise sequence. In reality, something else happened. Empirical analysis of the
Hungarian energy sector, the largest privatisation deal regionwide of 1995
(Vince 1996) has disclosed the opposite sequence. Large producing capacities
were passed over to often publicly owned-foreign investors, who have, of course
no interest in breaking up the monopoly structures or introduce the spot market
in place of an official formula based on marginal outlays plus 8 per cent
guaranteed profit. Such an option, while much praised in terms of ownership
change, may become a most serious obstacle to bringing down inflation to lower
single digit levels by the time of EU-accession.
High energy prices certainly may be a matter for public choice. A strong
emphasis on environmental concerns, or a priority to divest smoke chain
industries, may well justify this option. But in this case - which would currently
be hard to prove directly for Hungary, or even for Germany for that matter - the
appropriate way of attaining this goal would be imposing a levy or an across-the-
board environmental tax on energy users, which could feed a special
environmental fund on recultivating damaged areas and/or prophylactic
procedures. But leaving the fat profits with external investors,11 or giving way to
a corporate strategy aimed at modernising newly acquired assets exclusively
from price rises in a traditionally loss making sector, were textbook cases of
regulatory failures. In the latter case public policies are directly accountable for
the perverse consequences of privatisation conducted on a simplistic unidimen-
sional fashion with disregard for the economic fundamentals and rationale for the
entire process.
5. It goes without saying that reforming the welfare state requires utmost attention
to regulation. Both the health care and pension reforms are part and parcel of the
social contract making the free market economy socially acceptable. Therefore
the regulatory role of public policies will remain decisive even if fully funded
systems were to replace the current de facto planned economies prevailing in
both sectors.
Here several issues require regulation, even without getting down to the (hotly
debated) bits and pieces of detailed legislation in the respective countries. First in
both areas entitlements resulting from past legislation obviously overstrech
financial capacities. This applies a fortiori in countries with low birth rates, high
structural unemployment and ageing population. The situation is only
                                                          
11
 The point of criticism here is the opportunity cost of the actual procedure, i.e. foregone gains from a
hypothetic competitive version of privatisation, not that investors collect their risk premium.
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exacerbated by the need to cut social security contributions, currently the
strongest disincentive to new employment and taxpaying private activities alike.
Second, the employment situation in terms of decreased economic activity is
already tough, thus any measure inducing more elderly job-seekers is likely to be
rejected by the labour market. Incongruence of skills and jobs as well as
decreased learning abilities of the aged make such reforms risky. Though the
need to strike a clear dividing line between old-age beneficiaries and
unemployed is there, retroactive measures will hardly do. Mistakes of early
transition years, having channelled the lion's share of unemployed to the pension
sector will be impossible to remedy, which in turn is likely to constrain any new
model, which tries to exclude 
unqualified' hundreds of thousands or even
millions. Third in health care the problem of cost explosion due to new
techniques and new medicines looks insurmountable. Maintaining the equity
oriented present systems will likely to accelerate the ongoing spontaneous
privatisation. The latter, in turn, will create more divisive differences than a
reform of the entire system could have produced. Fourth, good economics in
these areas make previously implicit debts explicit and therefore immediately
enhance fiscal burdens. This may run counter to a stability-oriented economic
course.
A major danger is the lack of efficient regulation, which allows for parallel
spontaneous privatisation processes, which in turn may disintegrate Central and
East European societies in a way as was the case in the period prior to Count
Bismarck's reforms. While life expectancy increased dramatically since then, the
large family disintegrated, thus a mass phenomenon of the unattended elderly
may create a civilisational problem even if it enhances labour incentives and
related incomes.12 As inflation has already eaten up the savings of much of this
state across the region, any market-oriented reform's feasibility rests on the
supplementary measures that are meant to cope with those millions whose fate is
no longer in their own hands. The latter requires financing, whose costs must be
incorporated in the consolidated balance sheet of these rearrangements. Studies
currently available to me, including those of international agencies, fall short of
addressing these issues in a satisfactory manner, which only reinforces the
position of those opposing and obstructing any change in the name of equity. The
latter is, as shown above, a sure way sack to a civilisational pattern given up in
Europe more than a century ago.
                                                          
12
 For such a proposition cf. Sachs and Warner (1996).
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Posttransition Transformation: from Quantity to Quality?
What has been said above casts serious doubts over the efficacy of numerous
attempts at creating quantitative indices of measurement of progress in systemic
change. While in the phase of 
getting fundamentals right', or Transition to those set
of arrangements that exist in any edition of a market order these might have made
sense, in the later stage this situation changes. When stabilisation, liberalisation and
privatisation is mastered, Transition is over. But transforming the system, as EU
countries know only too well, is a never ending process. Welfare state reform, but
also agricultural, labour market and environmental legislation must be brought up
to the standards of the 21st century as well as of globalisation. Progress made here,
but also advances in mastering the problematique discussed in the five points of the
preceding section hardly lend themselves to quantitative assessment. This is
particularly bad news for economists trained in formalised approaches. But also
decisionmakers may find it embarrassing having to make qualitative value
judgements, rather than referring to objective indices, in explaining their choices.
In sum, while overall performance will be measurable as before, the usual trouble
with the explanatory power of individual established theories of actual
developments will haunt transformation studies as well. If such developments as
stagnation of the Czech economy in 1997 or successful Russian disinflation in 1996
require major reassessments, the theories in question were not sufficiently sound,
not appropriately generalised, or maybe irrelevant to the general subject.
Previous analyses have highlighted the focal role of structural reforms in creating
sustainable development in Central and Eastern Europe (World Bank 1996). This
also implicates that the decisive issue of the coming years (maybe even decades)
will be the quality of governance. This emerges in a series of key areas as a
recurring element of conclusions from sectoral studies. Corporate governance, i.e.
the institutional arrangements mastering the principal-agent problem between
owners and managers of large organisation is certainly one of the points in case.
Likewise, the regulatory complex of the financial sector is more comprehensive an
issue than it could be reflected in the state of fiscal balances. In fact, both the
Albanian and the Czech derailment should lend emphasis to this consideration.
Fiscal sector reform, though partly overlapping with welfare reform, is a subject on
its own right. Here transparency, accountability, congruity with international
accounting practices, as well as the ability to generate regular revenues sufficient to
finance public outlays, as approved by legislation (but without) having to recourse
extraordinary measures), may serve as evaluation criteria. In terms of legal reform
formalistic approaches may prove counterproductive, insofar as similar rules work
differently under dissimilar cultural conditioning. Thus more general concepts, as
the rule of law or contestability of markets, seem to be better suited to produce
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meaningful assessments as the percentage of EU or UN legislation incorporated
into the national legal framework.
What has been said does not invalidate to use of standard methods and quantitative
techniques in measuring various developments in transforming economies. But the
subject of the present paper was not to put the performance of Central and East
Europe into international perspective. Our task was to assess progress made and yet
to be made on the bumpy road of systemic change. In answering the question about
how much closer transforming countries have come to creating conditions for an
internationally competitive and sustainable development, standard quantitative
indicators give only the first clue. Industrial production or trade balance in the first
quarter do not reflect our concerns. It may well be - as previously in the case of
Chile, France and Britain, currently in case of Hungary or Russia - that sound
policies do not breed immediate success. Moreover, they may even have to account
for temporarily poor indicators. If, however, a sound analytical frame could be
elaborated, that could probably enhance the predictive strength of available
knowledge.
The present paper was an attempt to contribute to a better analytical understanding
of the state and prospects of economic transformation in Central and Eastern
Europe. Having surveyed quantitative and qualitative information, a synthesis was
attempted in a comparative perspective. Our findings clearly emphasize the
differences in performance in the 1990s. However, they also caution against the so
often failed, still reemerging practice of using the past for predicting the future.
Transformation studies try to identify, how congruous individual nations to EU are
and will be. The outcome is a new research agenda, with an emphasis on qualitative
aspects and a de-emphasis of short term indicators. Those relying on extrapolation
to save the pains of a comprehensive assessment will, again, find themselves
surprised all across the postsocialist region. The heritage of the past as well as the
role of specific institutions, i.e. two factors abstracted away by neoclassical growth
models will exert a growing influence on the developmental performance of the
second decade of systemic change in Central and Eastern Europe, which is to
reshape the landscape that emerge in the first phase. It is worth observing!
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Table 1: Central and Eastern Europe in 1996
GDP Industrial
Output
Inflation Rate of
Unem-
ployment
Trade
Balance
(% of
GDP)
Net
External
Debt
Stock of
FDI
Eastern Europe 4,0 7,1 n.a. 11,8 -9,7 71,1 30304
Albania n.a. n.a. n.a. 12,3 -26,7 0,3 258
Bulgaria -10,0 -1,0 311,1 12,5 2,0 9,4 399
Croatia 4,4 3,1 3,5 15,9 -17,6 2,6 609
Czech Republic 4,4 6,8 8,7 3,5 -11,5 6,1 7371
Hungary 0,5 3,3 19,9 10,5 -6,9 17,9 13377
Poland 6,0 9,1 18,6 13,6 -9,6 23,1 5492
Romania 4,1 9,8 56,8 6,3 -6,5 6,1 1184
Slovakia 6,9 2,5 5,5 12,8 -11,1 2,9 789
Slovenia 3,5 1,0 8,9 14,4 -5,9 1,7 786
Macedonia 1,6 3,2 0,3 39,8 -22,6 0,9 39
Serbia/
Montenegro
4,3 6,8 60,3 26,1 -15,3 n.a. n.a.
CIS -5,3 -3,4 n.a. 6,4 6,4 n.a. n.a.
Russia -6,0 -5,0 21,8 9,3 8,5 115,7 7519
Ukraine -10,0 -5,1 39,7 1,5 -3,0 7,8 1245
Belarus 3,0 3,2 39,1 4,0 -4,0 0,9 57
Moldova -8,0 -8,5 15,1 1,5 -10,1 0,3 167
Baltic States 3,4 1,7 n.a. 6,4 -18,6 -0,1 1787
Estonia 3,5 1,1 14,9 5,6 -26,4 -0,3 752
Latvia 2,5 0,7 13,2 7,1 -17,2 -0,2 775
Lithuania 4,0 2,8 13,1 6,2 -15,2 0,5 261
Source: ECE Economic Survey of Europe, 1996/1997.
Table 2: Medium term overview of GDP in selected countries
(real change in % against preceeding year)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995a 1996 1997 1998
Czech Republic -14,2 -6,4 -0,9 2,6 4,8 4,2 4,5 5,0
Hungary -11,9 -3,1 -0,6 2,9 1,5 0,5 2,0 3,5
Poland -7,0 2,6 3,8 5,2 7,0 6,0 6,0 6,0
Slovak Republic -14,5 -6,5 -3,7 4,9 7,4 6,9 5,0 5,0
Slovenia -8,9 -5,5 2,8 5,3 3,9 2,5 3,0 3,5
CEEC-5b -10,0 -1,5 1,3 4,2 5,5 4,6 4,8 5,2
Bulgaria -11,7 -7,3 -1,5 1,8 2,6 -10,0 -3,0 ---
Romania -12,9 -8,7 1,4 4,0 7,1 4,1 0,0 2,0
CEEC-7b -10,7 -3,2 1,1 4,0 5,5 3,4 3,4 ---
Croatia -19,8 -11,1 -0,9 0,6 1,7 3,5 5,0 4,0
Russia -5,0 -14,5 -8,7 -12,7 -4,2 -6,0 1,0 2,0
Ukraine -11,6 -13,7 -14,2 -23,0 -11,8 -7,0 2,0 4,0
a
 Preliminary
b
 WIIW estimate
Source: WIIW (1997), 1.
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Table 3: Overview developments in selected countries (1995 - 1998)
GDP real change
(% against previous year )
Consumer prices change
(% against previous year)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1995 1996 1997 1998
forecast forecast
Czech Republic 4,8 4,2 4,5 5,0 9,1 8,8 9,5 8,0
Hungary 1,5 0,5 2,0 3,5 28,2 23,6 19,0 15,0
Poland 7,0 6,0 6,0 6,0 27,8 20,0 16,0 13,0
Slovak Republic 7,4 6,9 5,0 5,9 9,9 5,8 7,0 7,0
Sloveniab 3,9 2,5 3,0 3,5 12,6 9,7 9,0 9,0
EEC-5 5,5 4,6 4,8 5,2 --- --- --- ---
Bulgaria 2,6 -10,0 -3,0 --- 62,2 123,1 45,0
Romania 7,1 4,1 0,0 2,0 32,3 38,8 70,0 40,0
CEEC-7 5,5 3,4 3,4 --- --- --- --- ---
Croatiab 1,7 3,5 4,0 4,0 2,0 3,5 4,5 5,5
FYR Macedoniac -2,0 1,6 4,0 4,0 15,9 4,0 10,0 10,0
FR Yugoslaviac 6,0 4,0 1,0 1,0 74,1 95,0 80,0 50,0
Russiad -4,2 -6,0 1,0 2,0 198,0 48,0 18,0 20,0
Ukraine -11,0 -7,0 2,0 4,0 377,0 90,0 50,0 30,0
Rate of unemployment
(%, end of period)
Current account
(US-$ mn)
Czech Republic 2,9 3,5 3,8 4,0 -1362 -4200 -4400 -4000
Hungary 10,9 10,5 10,5 10,5 -2480 -1500 -2000 -2600
Poland 14,9 13,5 13,0 13,0 -2299 -1000a -2500a -3500a
Slovak Republic 13,1 12,0 13,0 13,0 646 -1500 -1500 -1000
Sloveniab 14,5 14,0 13,0 12,0 -36 -150 -200 -250
CEEC-5 12,1 --- --- --- -5531 -8350 -10600 -11350
Bulgaria 11,1 12,5 13,5 --- 43 0 100 ---
Romania 8,9 6,1 8,0 8,0 -1336 -1900 -1500 -1700
CEEC-7 11,2 --- --- --- -6910 -10250 -12000 -13050
Croatiab 17,4 18,0 19,0 19,0 -1712 -1200 -1200 -1200
FYR Macedoniac 39,1 42,0 40,0 35,0 -216 -300 -300 -300
FR Yugoslaviac 27,0 30,0 35,0 35,0 -500 -1200 -1000 -500
Russiad 8,8 9,3 10,0 11,0 12261 10000 8000 6000
Ukraine 0,6 2,0 9,0d 12,0d -1545 -600 -600 -600
a Including net unrecorded exports.
b Consumer prices correspond to retail prices
c
 GDP corresponds to Gross Material Product
d
 Unemployment rate according to ILO methodologiy
Source: WIIW (1997), 12.
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Table 4: Consumer price inflation change in % against preceding year
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995a 1996 1997 1998
Czech Republic 56,7 11,1 20,8 10,0 9,1 8,8 9,5 8,0
Hungary 35,0 23,0 22,5 18,8 28,1 23,6 19,0 15,0
Poland 70,3 43,0 35,3 32,2 27,8 20,0 16,0 13,0
Slovak Republic 61,2 10,0 23,2 13,4 9,9 5,8 7,0 7,0
Sloveniab 117,7 201,3 32,3 19,8 12,6 9,7 9,0 9,0
Bulgaria 338,5 91,3 72,9 96,2 62,2 123,1 450,0
Romania 170,2 210,4 256,1 136,8 32,3 38,8 70,0 40,0
Croatiab 123,0 665,5 1517,5 97,6 2,0 3,5 4,5 5,5
Russia 92,6 1526,0 875,0 307,0 198,0 48,0 18,0 20,0
Ukraine 91,2 1210,0 5371,0 891,0 377,0 90,0 50,0 30,0
a
 Preliminary
b
 Retail prices
Source: WIIW (1997), 4.
Table 5: Real exchange rates in NCE per DEM (PPI deflated)
(annual average change in %)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
preliminary
Czech Republic -4,4 -6,0 -13,7 -3,8 -1,4 -6,9
Hungary 12,0 1,8 -0,6 5,7 6,5 -4,6
Poland -21,2 3,4 -4,9 2,9 -2,3 -7,8
Slovak Republic -3,7 -2,0 -12,2 -2,8 -2,0 -6,1
Slovenia 8,6 0,5 8,2 -0,8 -6,1 2,1
Bulgaria 433,6 -3,3 -11,6 16,1 -7,5 2,7
Romania -2,7 52,5 -11,9 -7,1 4,7 1,4
Croatia -13,3 28,1 -21,9 -2,6 -0,2 -1,6
Russia 25,0 589,6 -65,3 -49,0 -32,0 -38,0
Ukraine 32,0 406,7 -52,5 -19,3 -5,9 -24,6
Note: National currency units. PPI: Producer price index. Producer price index.
Minus sign indicates real appreciation.
Source: WIIW (1997), 7.
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